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COPYRIGHTS FROM A CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Children have a unique perspective on life. They see the world through
bright, young eyes and are usually enthusiastic about every new sight, sound,
taste, and feeling. One legal scholar commented that "[c]hildhood is a time
for carefree fun and play... in a realm protected from 'harsh realities.' "'
Although this excitement is often refreshing, it can also mean that children
do not inspect these sights and sounds as carefully as adults do and are often
easily fooled by imitations. The Southern District of New York pointed out
this concept in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., when it stated, "[iln [the
youngsters'] enthusiasm to acquire... [the objects] they are certainly not
bent upon 'detecting disparities' or even readily observing upon inspection
such fine details..."' In Ideal, the plaintiff made children's dolls and claimed
that the defendant had copied the dolls with the only change being a slightly
different neck.' The court held that most adults, let alone children, would
not be able to discern the difference between the two dolls and concluded
that a copyright4 infringement' had occurred.6
A psychological study also examined this concept by showing children
five and under sponges that looked like rocks.7 More often than not, these
children could not tell the tester that they saw what was really there: the
sponge! The tester observed that "[c]hildren at this [young] age often aren't
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference andMystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36
ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 92 (1994).
2 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238, 242, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 500, 503 (S.D.N.Y
1966).
'1d
4 Black's Law Dictionary defines copyright as "a property right in an original work of authorship
(such as a literary, musical, artistic, photographic or film work) fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, giving the holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display the
work.* BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (7th ed. 1999).
' Copyright Infringement is defined as the "act of violating any of a copyright owner's exclusive
rights granted by the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. S 106, 602* including the rights to reproduce,
to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, to perform or display publicly, for sound recordings,
or importing the work into the United States. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (7th ed. 1999).
' Ideal Toy Corp., 261 F. Supp. at 241.
7 John H. Flavell, Really and Truly: Until TheyAre 4 or 5, Children Don't Understand the Distinction
Between Appearance and Realiry; lYbat You See is Not Always Wat You Get, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1986,
at 38, 38.
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quite able to grasp the idea that what you see is not always what you get."9
These children were not always willing to immediately accept that the
sponge was not a rock. They saw a rock.
Being able to discern and compare subtle differences between objects is
important when determining whether or not a work has actually been
copied. One legal scholar commented that "[c]hildren represent a distinct
and significant consumer group,""0 and they "have more money, exercise
more influence on their families, and acquire their own purchasing habits
and product preferences at an earlier age than did their counterparts in any
previous generation."" Even though children do not generally purchase
toys, they do tell their parents which toys they want. Parents, wanting to
keep their children happy, often comply with their children's wishes. One
court noted this truism when it said that often such "protected works [works
aimed at children] are purchased as 'surprise' gifts-and thus necessarily
outside of the child's presence.... [However,] their impressions and views
were the primary influences on the purchase decision."12
Because children are more susceptible to believing that what they actually
see is what they want to see and more and more works are being aimed
directly at them, there should be a better means for determining when
copyright infringement has occurred on goods intended for and marketed
towards children. Courts should look to how the child actually perceives the
article and not how an adult, or an ordinary observer,13 would view the exact
same object.
To show why different considerations are needed for works directed at
children, one must first look at the evolution of the copyright infringement
action and where children stand today. Part II of this Note will give a brief
explanation of the history of copyright infringement actions and one of the
traditional copyright doctrines, the ordinary observer test. Next, many legal
lat 38.
10 Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Copyrigbt Infringement Actions: The Proper RoleforAudience Reactions
in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 411 (1981).
" l (quoting Schiele, How to Reach the Young Consumer, HARV. Bus. REV. Mar.-Apr., 1974, at 77-
78).
12 Lyons P'ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 803, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102, 1112 (4th
Cir. 2001) (criticizing the district court's opinion that the perspective of the child is irrelevant because the
adult decides whether to spend the money to purchase the work or not).
t Sitzer, supra note 11, at 386 (stating that an ordinary observer is an average, reasonable "spectator"
of the two works).
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scholars are looking into psychological aspects of laws involving children. 4
Part IMI gives two theories of development of the mind of a child and explains
why the perspective of a child is different than that of an adult.
Next, children are treated differently, and often are given more protec-
tion, than adults are in many legal aspects. Other areas of the law recognize
that the mind of a child is different and not always as perceptive as that of an
adult. For example, in contract law, children cannot enter into legally
binding agreements because courts fear that children do not really know
what they are binding themselves or others to."5 Further in torts, children
may not be liable for something that an adult would be had the adult
engaged in the exact same behavior. 6 Part IV explains how the law in
general recognizes the difference between adults and children, and, then,
provides a few specific examples of legal areas that have laid down special
rules for children. These specific rules can be helpful to see how copyright
law can evolve to apply different rules for works aimed at children as well.
Next, several courts are beginning to change the traditional ordinary
observer test for substantial similarity into the "intended audience" test. 7
Part V shows how this evolution is occurring and expanding. Finally,
several courts and commentators are beginning to use the child's perception
as the standard for infringement cases on works directed at children. Part VI
explains how these cases and their results show that this standard is
acceptable, gaining popularity, and should become the majority standard
applied to children's works.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE TEST FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
ACTIONS AND THE ORDINARY OBSERVER TEST
Copyright protection stems from the Constitution, which states
"Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science..., by
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
"* Seegenerally Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, WbataDifferenceaDayMakes: AgelPresumptions, Child
Psychology, and the Standard of Care Required of Children, 24 PAc. LJ. 1323 (1993).
Is See generally Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
See generally Donald J. Gee & Charlotte Peoples Hodges, The Liability of Children, At What Age
is a Child Deemed to Have the Capacity Required for Negligence, Contributory Negligence, or Comparative
Negligence?, 35 TRIAL 52 (1999).
' See generally Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132 (4th Cir.
1990).
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respective Writings ... ."" One court stated that "[t]o achieve the constitu-
tional aspirations of promoting science and the useful arts, copyright
legislation 'assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed
by a work.' "" From this grant of authority, Congress has perceived
copyright protection to extend to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."2
An early case that distinguished between ideas and expressions of those
ideas was Baker v. Selden.2' In that case, the Supreme Court held that while
a book on accounting methods and the statements within it were
copyrightable, the actual method described in the book was not. Therefore,
"as embodied and taught in a literary composition or book, their [teachings
and rules] essence consists only in their statement. This alone is what is
secured by the copyright."'
Judge Learned Hand was concerned with the difficulty in discerning
between ideas and expressions; therefore he derived the abstractions test. 3
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,24 the plaintiff, author of a play, alleged
that the defendants infringed upon it when making a motion picture. This
abstractions test is based on the concept that "[s]tanding alone, the fact that
the two stories share common elements is not indicative of infringement;
these elements are merely ideas [or abstracts], not subject to copyright
protection. But, if these ideas were expressed similarly enough, infringement
could occur."" Although, the "abstractions" test is helpful in the copyright
" U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, Cl. 8.
"B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding theFactofFamiliarity: AssessingJudicialSimirity Tests in Copyright
Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489,493 (2001) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)).
17 U.S.C. S 102(a) (1994).
21 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
" William M. Hart, An Otemiew of the Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK LAW FOR
THE NONPECIAuST 2000, at 9 (PU Pats., Copyright, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook
Series No. GO-00GX).
" Michael L. Sharb, Getting a 'Total Concept and Feel* of Copyright Infringement, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 903, 910 (1993).
, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
25 Sharb, supra note 24, at 911.
[Vol. 9:387
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world, it really gives no guidance on the question of how much similarity is
enough to constitute an infringement.
It was not until 1946 and the decision of Arnstein v. Porter6 that the issue
of similarity became clearer. Arnstein has been called a legendary decision
in instructing courts on what constitutes infringement, and the general test
used today stems from this opinion. There, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had plagiarized several of his songs and had been making a profit
from this plagiarism. Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Clark concluded
that there were two separate elements necessary for the plaintiff to prove in
an infringement action. The first element is "that defendant copied from
plaintiff's copyrighted work."29 The second element is "that the copying
(assuming it to be proved) went too far as to constitute improper appropria-
tion."3" To prove the first element, Clark stated that an admission by the
defendant or circumstantial evidence, such as access to plaintiff's work,
would suffice." As for the second element, Clark stated that "the test is the
response of the ordinary lay [person]";32 therefore, if an ordinary person
would hear or see sufficient similarities in the two works, then, infringement
has occurred. Today's test for copyright infringement is based on the basic
principles stated in Arnstein.
Presently, there are two main factors necessary for a plaintiff to prove
copyright infringement." To establish these elements, the plaintiff "must
prove both the ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the
defendant."" The first element is easy to satisfy. According to the
Copyright Act of 1976," prima facie evidence of copyright ownership can
be proved by presenting a copyright registration certificate.' 6
26 154 F.2d 464, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (2d Cir. 1946).
2 Stanfield, supra note 20, at 494.
2' Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 293 (2d Cir. 1946).
30 id31 Id
32 Id
33 Jonathan Zavin, C pyrigbt Infringement Litigation, Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series, Practicing Law Institute (2001).
)' Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 654 F. 2d 204, 207, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (2d Cir.
1981). See also Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Adver. Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671,675,5 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1833 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that an issue of material fact existed with regard to the likelihood
of actual confusion between two commercials, both of which featured actress Deborah Sheldon).
s 17 U.S.C. SS 101-801 (1994).
17 U.S.C. S 410(c) (1994) states that:
2002]
5
Vining: Copyrights From a Child's Perspective
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2002
. INTELL. PROP. L.
Once ownership is proved, the court then turns to actual copying. This
second element proves to be harder to establish. The easiest way to establish
copying of a plaintiff's work is by direct evidence or eyewitness testimony.1
However, because such direct proof is often hard to find, plaintiffs are
allowed to use circumstantial evidence. 8 To prove copying in this manner,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work
and that the two works are substantially similar." The access prong of this
test is important because if the defendant never saw or heard the work, it is
practically impossible that he or she could have copied it.' A plaintiff can
prove access by showing that the defendant had an opportunity to see or
hear the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff does not have to prove without a
doubt that the defendant actually saw the work, only that the defendant "had
the opportunity to do so."41 However, access can be inferred by striking
similarity which negates the possibility of originality or a common source.42
Therefore, "a greater showing of similarity (as in striking similarity) will
allow for a lesser showing of access."43
The second element required to show copying proves to be confusing due
to the varying use of "substantial similarity" by different courts." One court
even went so far as to say "the determination of the extent of similarity
which will constitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the
least susceptible of helpful generalizations."" To determine whether two
works are substantially similar, courts must decide whether the works
contain more than the same general ideas or themes. In 1966, the Second
[in any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary
weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within
the discretion of the court.
"Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyright
Infringement, 5 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 43, 45 (1995).
Warner Bros., 654 F.2d at 207.
" Broaduss, supra note 38, at 47.
42 Id.
" i at 48.
4 Id. at 49.
4s Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 654 F.2d 204,207,211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97,100 (2d Cir.
1981).
[Vol. 9:387
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Circuit stated that "the appropriate test for determining whether substantial
similarity is present is whether an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."' For
instance, in Warner Bros., the plaintiff was the holder of the copyright to the
character Superman and the works embodying him and claimed that the
defendants infringed upon its copyright by creating a television character
known as "The Greatest American Hero."47 The Second Circuit held that
the creators of Superman could not hold a monopoly on all superheroes and
that the two heroes were not so similar as to cause an ordinary observer to
confuse the two." The court stated that the two characters have different
demeanors: Superman is graceful, calm, and confidant, while the other is
clumsy and nervous."9 This extreme change in demeanors is enough for an
ordinary person to differentiate between the two."0
While the concept of the ordinary observer is used more often in modern
cases, it is said to have originated"' in 1868 with the case of Daly v. Palmers2
where the court held that a play would cause similar emotions and reactions
from the ordinary audience as a copyrighted play." Therefore, a normal
audience would not necessarily be able to distinguish between the two plays,
or, in other words, the infringing play would definitely conjure up images
of the original play.
The main reason for the ordinary observer test is to "ascertain the effect
of the alleged infringing [work] upon the public, that is, upon the average
reasonable [person]."' This view probably stems from the fact that ordinary
people are not experts and are not inclined to find tiny differences or
similarities in every possible copyrighted thing.5 Judge Learned Hand stated
that the "ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would
be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
a Warner Bros., 654 F.2d at 205.
48 Id.0 id
50 Id
S1 Sitzer, supra note 11, at 389.
' Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
s Id
Broaddns, supra note 38, at 62 (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir.
1933)).
" See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154 (2d Cir.
1960).
2002]
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same." s Thus, the ordinary person will not be too picky about the details
involved within each work.
The ordinary observer includes everyone: men, women, children, the
elderly, and so on. This grouping is fine for- most works that are aimed at
the public in general. However, many things are directed at children
specifically, not the general public. The use of the ordinary observer as the
test for the substantial similarity aspect is the point where the test for
children's works should diverge from the general test for copyright
infringement.
Copyright law has evolved beyond its original purpose of protecting
printed books. However, the child audience has been overlooked. There is
no reason why it cannot continue to evolve into specifically looking at
works from a child's perspective.
IM. DEVELOPMENT OF A CHILD'S MIND AND THE CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE
A recent trend has been to allow psychological findings into a variety of
legal arguments.5 7 Legal scholars have noted that "[t]his phenomena is part
of a larger trend in legal scholarship that seeks insights into resolving legal
questions from academic disciplines outside the law, particularly the social
sciences and humanities." 8 The field of child psychology is continuously
growing, and psychologists are learning more and more about how the mind
of a child works. This knowledge helps one to understand why a different
standard is needed for copyrighted works aimed at children.
Prior to the 1970s, the leading view among child psychologists was that
children were unable to conduct deductive reasoning until the age of
fourteen or fifteen. 9 Therefore, throughout childhood, children are
constantly learning and developing skills to be able to think and react to
problems like adults. Further, from this view, "the capacity to grasp these
concepts is an all-or-nothing proposition: Either a child is capable of
understanding objective relations and using this knowledge to behave
intelligently across all tasks and situations or the child is not."'
Id at 489.
s7 Lisa Perrochet & Ugo ColeUl, Whata fferencea Day Makes: Age Presumptions, ChildPsychology,
and the Standard of Care Required of Children, 24 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1331 (1993).
id
s9 Id at 1335. Jean Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, was a dominant proponent of this view.
Id at 1336.
[Vol. 9:387
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Today, the field of psychology has branched into many different
specialties, including cognitive psychology, which involves the study of
learning and development." Specifically, it is "the scientific study of mental
events."' 2 Psychologists study the brain and why certain people react
differently to the exact same stimuli.6' Modem psychologists take a slightly
different view on the capacity of children to understand the world. An
article in the Pacific Law Journal noted that:
[u]nlike Piaget, who assumed children's thinking was
qualitatively and structurally different from that of an adult,
cognitive psychologists presume that the structure of
children's thinking is identical to adults and that differences
in capacity are due to the child's limited grasp of language,
knowledge, and experience rather than some inherent defect
or immaturity in thought processes."
Further, modem psychologists feel that social aspects of life lend to
cognitive development in children. Therefore, while disagreeing with Piaget
about why, the modem theory of childhood development still recognizes
that children do have different mindsets and patterns of thinking than
adults.'
IV. How THE LAW VIEWS CHILDREN IN GENERAL AND IN
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES
Lawmakers generally agree that children are different from adults and
need special rights and protections. Elizabeth S. Scott stated that "American
lawmakers have had relatively clear images of childhood and adult-
hood-images that fit with our conventional notions. Children are innocent
beings, who are dependent, vulnerable, and incapable of making competent
decisions."' Further, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he law
" Ellen D. Gagne et al., THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCHOOL LEARNING, 4 (Harper Collins
College Publishers, 2d ed. 1993).
62 Id.
" Perrochet & Colella, supra note 58, at 1337-38.
"Elizabeth S. Scott, Essay: Tbe Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 547
20021
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recognizes that children-particularly young children-are not fully
accountable for their actions because they lack the capacity to exercise
mature judgment."67
Adults view children as little beings with the potential to grow up and be
an adult.' Wendy Anton Fitzgerald stated "[tlhat children are inferior to
adults under the law makes rational sense, of course, because we understand
children as potential adults, and childhood as their preparation for
adulthood."69  Because of their underdeveloped cognitive skills, children
cannot "employ reasoning and understanding sufficiently to make choices on
the basis of a rational decision-making process,"' and are "innocent and
naive, if not foolish and short-sighted."7 ' Further, since children have
immature skills, they make decisions that may be harmful to themselves and
others. Consequently, the law applies different rules for children.
The law assumes that children lack the capacity for reasoning and
understanding; therefore, children "cannot vote, make most medical
decisions, drink alcohol, or drive motor vehicles."' Also, many fear that
since children are often rash, they are more vulnerable to harm than adults
and need greater protections, which often means greater limitations.
Children are restricted from buying certain "obscene materials" that are
protected for adults under the First Amendment. 73 The idea behind such
laws is that if children are exposed to such items they may exercise immature
judgement, not realize the ramifications of their behavior, and find
themselves in unexpected circumstances. 4 Finally, other people may know
that the child does not completely understand whatever transaction may be
occurring and try to manipulate the child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
summed up these fears when it said that a child "should be protected from
(2000).
' Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 672 (1999) (citing 1 E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS S 4.4 (2d ed. 1998)).
"Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law,
36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 13 (1994).
9 I'L
70 Scott, supra note 67, at 550.
7' Fitzgerald, supra note 69, at 92.
7 Scott, supra note 67, at 552.
73 M at 552-53.
74 Id2
[Vol. 9:387
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his own bad judgments as well as from adults who would take advantage of
him. "7
The above discussion shows how the law in general views children
differently than adults. While the field of intellectual property, specifically
copyright law, has not yet evolved to always include special rules for cases
involving children and children's works, it can borrow from other areas of
the law and their leading theories. Two main areas of the law that do have
set rules for children are torts and contracts.76 Below will be a brief
explanation of the laws in those two areas and how their rules can be useful
in determining what to do in the circumstance of children and copyrights.
In tort law, the issue of children's capacity becomes important when
dealing with the question of contributory negligence. 7 Contributory
negligence is "an affirmative defense which must be pled by the defendant
who has the burden of proving that the plaintiff's blameworthy conduct was
a contributing factor causing the plaintiff's injury or damage." 8 To prove
contributory negligence, the defendant must show that the plaintiff (1) knew
of the circumstances; (2) realized the danger; and (3) failed to exercise
reasonable care by getting in the way of the danger.79
While "[c]ourts have taken different courses with varying results as to
whether or when a young child is capable of contributory negligence," 0
almost every jurisdiction has adopted some form of one of two approaches:
the Illinois Rule or the Massachusetts Rule (the Modem Trend)."1 Under the
Illinois rule, the determination of a child's capacity to realize the risks
associated with their behavior rests solely upon age. "2 Courts utilizing this
rule conclusively presume that a child under the age of seven is incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 3 Further, there is a rebuttable
s Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968).
See generally Donald J. Gee & Charlotte People Hodges, The Liability of Children, At What Age is
a Child Deemed to Have the Capacity Required for Negligence, Contributory Negligence, or Comparative
Negligence?, 35 TRIAL 52 (1999); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, S 4.4 (Aspen Publishers Inc, 3d ed. 1999).
n See, eg., Lori Rinella, Children of Tender Years and Contributory Negligence, 63 UMKC L. REV. 475(1994).
Id at 475-76 (citing JUDGE HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT S 1.12, at 4 (2d ed. 1987)).
Id (citing WOODS, supra note 79, at 8-9).
0 dIL at 476.
" See Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, What a Difference a Day Makes: Age Presumptions, Child
Psychology, and the Standard of Care Required of Children, 24 PAC. L.J. 1323 (1993).
'" Id. at 1365.
' Rinella, supra note 78, at 480.
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presumption that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are also
incapable of negligence. 4- Finally, under the Illinois rule, children over
fourteen years of age are presumed to be capable of negligence with the
burden shifting to the minor child to prove that he/she did not have the
capacity.8"
Proponents of this rule argue that it has several advantages, including the
ease of application and a high level of predictability. 6 However, there are
many critics who feel that the rule only provides useless, arbitrary age limits
and has "total disregard for the child's actual knowledge and appreciation of
the danger and risk of his conduct.""7 The modem rule developed to take
these fears into account.
The Massachusetts rule, otherwise known as the Modem Trend,
"embraces a picture of child development that treats chronological age as
only one of several factors involved in the determination of whether a minor
has the capacity for negligent conduct."8" This method includes the child's
knowledge and experience as factors to be used in a factual inquiry of the
child's capacity.' 9 If the child is "deemed to be capable of contributory
negligence, the court must next determine the standard of care required of
the child to be free from contributory negligence."90 Generally, the standard
of care required is that of a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, and
experience under similar circumstances. 9'- The court evaluates whether the
actions of the child are reasonable compared to that standard of care.'
No matter which view is used, all jurisdictions agree that children are
different than adults and should be treated differently. While an adult might
easily recognize a situation as dangerous, the danger may not be so clear to
a child. Therefore, children will not always be held accountable for their
behavior, even though it contributed to their injuries.
Is14
"Id
'7 Id at 481.
" Perrochet & Colella, supr note 82, at 1368.
Id at 1369.
o Rinella, supra note 78, at 483.
'* Id at 484.
Id (citing Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1982)) (stating that the standard of care
of a seven-year-old child is to conduct himself as a reasonable person would under the circumstances
having the child's actual age, intelligence, and experience with regard to judgment and appreciation of risk
and danger).
[Vol. 9:387
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Another area of the law that has specific rules for children is contracts.
Farnsworth's TREATISE ON CONTRACTS states that "[c]ommon law courts
early announced the prevailing view that a minor's contract is 'voidable' at
the instance of the minor."9" In 1914, the New York Court of Appeals stated
the general rule that a child is "[r]egarded as not having sufficient capacity to
understand and pass upon questions involving contractual rights, and,
therefore, a person dealing with him does so at his peril, and subject to the
right of the infant to avoid his contract when he becomes of age."94 That
court also stated that "[t]he rule is well understood that attempted contracts
by an infant are incomplete and imperfect, and do not become valid and
binding except by the act or failure to act of the infant after he reaches the
age of maturity.""' Therefore, a contract entered into by a child is not
binding on the child unless he so chooses after he reaches the age of the
majority. This rule has remained intact until the present day.'
Although the rules about children in both tort and contract law involve
children who are actually parties in the lawsuits, the law of copyrights
should still build from those rules. Both examples allow for a lower set of
standards in cases involving children. Tort law does not hold children
responsible for certain acts that adults would be liable for, and contract law
allows minors to opt out of otherwise valid contracts. Traditional copyright
law should expand to account for children's limited capacity and poorer
understanding of general concepts. What might obviously be dissimilar to
adults may not look quite so different from the eyes and perception of a
child.
V. THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW DocTRINE-THE INTENDED USER TEST
While "[t]he traditional test for improper appropriation [in the area of
copyright infringement] is the lay observer test,""' many courts and
commentators are beginning to recognize the limitations of this test and are
"FARNSWORTH, supra note 77 (citing 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51(1926)).
In re Farley, State Excise Com'r, 106 N.E. 756, 757 (N.Y. 1914).
ld See also Kaufman v. Am. Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957)
(holding that an agreement signed by plaintiffs minor daughter releasing corporation from any liability
resulting from loss of property or personal injury occurring on a youth trip was not binding upon
plaintiff's infant daughter, but was void or voidable).
"See FARNSWOTH, supra note 77.
97 Broaddus, supra note 38, at 62.
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applying what is known as the intended audience test.9" Originating in
Arnstein v. Porter," one legal scholar labelled the intended audience test as
"the emergence of a true audience test."'O' Moreover, he stated that Arnstein
"represents a major breakthrough for the use of spectator reactions in
copyright infringement actions, because the court finally recognized that it
is the actual audience, and not some obscure notion of an average reasonable
person, that provides the artist with the economic incentive to create."101
There, the plaintiff claimed infringement of several of his musical composi-
tions, one of which had sold over a million copies. 2 The Second Circuit
stated that, "[t]he question, therefore, is whether [the] defendant took from
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff."' Arguably, a member of the audience for whom popular music
is composed is a member of the general, lay population, 1°' but it is still
important to note that the Arnstein court did state that the actual listening
audience fits into the evaluation of a copyright infringement case.
Expanding on Arnstein, other courts have followed the "intended
audience" test.'05 For instance, the Fourth Circuit, in Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music Inc.,'° applied the intended audience test in a case involving a musical
copyright infringement action." 7 However, unlike the ordinary music case,
this court was faced with an unusual problem." The appropriation did not
involve a regular sound recording played for all to hear, but, instead,
involved only written sheet music."' The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
reversed a lower court decision, which found no copyright infringement and
relied upon "an interpretation of the ordinary observer test wherein a lay
" lat64.
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,68 U.S.PQ. (BNA) 288 (2d Cir. 1946).
10 Sitzer, supra note 11, at 393.
101 Id.
Id.
1 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
Sitzer, supra note 11, at 393.
105 Broaddus, supra note 38, at 64.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 15 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1132 (4th Cir. 1990).
"Id
1" Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea.Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended Audience in
Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 395, 407 (1992).
10 Id
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listener was synonymous with a lay observer."10 The Dawson Court stated
that:
obedience to the undisputed principles of copyright law and
the policy underlying the ordinary observer test requires a
recognition of the limits of the ordinary lay observer
characterization of the ordinary observer test. Those
principles require orientation of the ordinary observer test
to the works' intended audience, permitting an ordinary lay
observer characterization of the test only where the lay
public fairly represents the works' intended audience."'
Therefore, the court felt that the Arnstein test was too broad and refined the
audience test.112
Further, the Court stated that it read the Arnstein decision to logically
require that the intended audience's reaction should be the relevant inquiry
where such audience is considerably more specialized than a pool of lay
observers."' The Fourth Circuit concluded that "[w]hen conducting the
second prong of the substantial similarity inquiry, a district court must
consider the nature of the intended audience of the plaintiff's work,"1 4 and
"if the intended audience is more narrow in that it possesses specialized
expertise... that lay people would lack, the court's inquiry should focus on
whether a member of the intended audience would find the two works to be
substantially similar.""' The court finally stated that the new label, the
intended audience test, should replace the old one, the ordinary observer test,
as the label of the appropriate test. 16
Nevertheless, the Dawson court retracted somewhat by stating that the
general lay public is, in most cases, a fair representation of the actual
intended audience."' The Court further stated that "[w]e therefore believe
that, in any given case, a court should be hesitant to find that the lay public
10 Stanfield, supra note 20, at 504.
" Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731,733 (4th Cir. 1990).
11 Stanfield, supra note 20, at 505.
m Dawson, 905 F.2d at 734.
1 Id at 736.
115 Id
116 Id
" Id at 737; see aso Grinvalsky, supra note 109, at 407.
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does not fairly represent a work's intended audience" and that deviance from
the lay person standard is justified only in the specific circumstances where
the intended audience has special knowledge." 8
Therefore, while the Dawson court did adopt the "intended audience"
standard for judging the substantial similarity prong of copyright infringe-
ment actions and helped to further open the door to allowing a separate test
for works directed at a specialized audience, it also left the waters slightly
muddy. One commentator noted that even after Dawson, "a straight
forward application of the test is difficult at best to achieve."" 9 However,
several cases have used the rules pronounced in Arnstein and Dawson to
imply a separate rule for copyright infringement cases involving works
aimed at children.
VI. CASES UTILIZING A DISTINCT RULE IN ACTIONS INVOLVING
CHILDREN
One of the first copyright infringement cases to single out children was
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd.'° There, the plaintiff was one of the largest
manufacturers of dolls in the United States and claimed that the defendant
copied one of its very successful line of dolls. The defendant's dolls had
slight differences in appearance from the plaintiff's, such as poorer craftsman-
ship and different neck molding.'" However, the overall aesthetic appeal of
the dolls was the same. The Ninth Circuit stated that "the ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook.., and regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same."' The Court
further stated that this ease of overlooking the disparities is especially
important because the appeal of the toys lies with children.24
The Court went on to conclude that "in applying the test of the average
lay observer, they [youngsters] are not to be excluded-indeed they are the
' Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990).
,' Grinvalsky, supra note 109, at 408.
' 261 F. Supp. 238, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'2' Id at 239.
u2 Id at 240.
' Id at 241 (quoting Chief Judge Learned Hand in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487, 489, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1960)).
" Idead Toy Corp., 261 F. Supp. at 241.
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'far-flung faithful... audience.' "1,5 It is the children who influence their
parents to go out to the stores and buy these dolls; 126 therefore, they should
not be left out of the equation when determining whether a work has been
infringed upon or not.
While the Ideal court did not specifically delineate a rule for separating an
infringement analysis when the work involved is aimed at children, it did
include children into the large group of ordinary observers. Several courts
have used this idea in recognizing children as a distinct group. Thus, the
decision helped to lay the groundwork for implementing just such a rule.
In Sid & Marty Krojfl Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,127
the plaintiffs, the Kroffts, were puppeteers who had created a popular
Saturday morning children's television show, H.R. Pufnstuf The series
revolved around several costumed characters, including the mayor, Pufnstuf,
living in a fantasyland called "Living Island."' 8 The television show became
widely popular among children and generated a line of products and
endorsements. The Kroffts claimed that the defendant, McDonald's, had
infringed upon the Pufrstufseries through its successful ad campaign known
as McDonaldland, which included, among other things, a mayor known as
Mayor McCheese.'29
Using the intended audience laid out in Arnstein, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that "[t]he question, therefore, is whether defendant took from
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the [eyes and] ears of lay
[persons), who comprise the audience for whom such popular [works are]
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs
to the plaintiff."13 The court took particular notice of the fact that both
works here were directed at children."' The Ninth Circuit concluded that
"[t]he present case demands an even more intrinsic determination because
both plaintiffs' and defendants' works are directed to an audience of children.
This raises the particular factual issue of the impact of the respective works
"lU at 241 (quoting Rushton v. Vitale, 218 P.2d 434, 436, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 159 (2d Cir.
1955)).
11 Id at 242.
1v 562 F.2d 1157, 196 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977).
n Id at 1161.
in Id at 1166.
l at 1165 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 296-97 (2d
Cir. 1946)).
. Sitzer, supra note 11, at 410.
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upon the minds and imaginations of young people.""' The defendant,
McDonalds, tried to differentiate its characters from the Pufnstuf characters:
Pufnstuf wears what can only be described as a yellow and
green dragon suit with a blue cummberband from which
hangs a medal which says 'mayor.' 'McCheese' wears a
version of a pink formal dress 'tails' with knicker trousers.
He has a typical diplomat's sash on which is written
'mayor,' the 'M' consisting of the McDonald's trademark of
an 'M' made of golden arches."'
The court rejected this argument stating that "[w]e do not believe that the
ordinary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works will even
notice" these subtle, detailed distinctions. 34
Again, the Kroffi case did not expressly state a different rule for copy-
righted works directed towards children; however, this case, like the Ideal
Toy Comp. decision, recognized that children must be included in a factual
determination of whether two works are substantially similar. Moreover,
the Kroffi decision specifically pointed out that the impact of the works on
the minds and imaginations of children is a valid inquiry that courts should
make.
Another case incorporating a child's perspective is Atari, Inc. v. North
American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp."'s This case involved an
electronic arcade game known as PA C-MAN. The game consisted of a little
yellow "gobbler" who, under the control of the player, was guided through
a four-sided maze filled with dots and power capsules (for the gobbler to
eat). 36 The infringing work also contained a rectangular maze through
which a "gobbler" was guided with the goal of avoiding monsters and trying
to eat moving dots and power capsules."' The defendants stated that their
game was substantially different because they included moving dots, maze
" Sid & Mary Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166, 196
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 97, 104 (9th Cir. 1977).
133 Id
13 Id. at 1167.
135 672 F.2d 607, 214 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 33 (7th Cir. 1982) (superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Scandia Dawn Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985)).
"3 Atari, 672 F.d at 610.
IV i1 at 611.
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variations, and facial feature changes in the characters.138 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the detailed differences did not matter, especially in cases
concerning children's works.3 9 The court stated that "[v]ideo games, unlike
an artist's painting or even other audiovisual works, appeal to an audience
that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their concern about more subtle
differences in artistic expression."140
Therefore, children just want to play the game and are not necessarily
worried about tiny details, such as maze shape variations. Unless the
differences are very dramatic, a child interested in the game may not even
notice changes, even though an adult would. The Atari opinion demon-
strated that since children do not judge works as carefully as adults, works
directed at them require a different test for a finding of substantial similarity.
While the cases above incorporate a child's perspective into their tests, the
following two cases are examples of decisions that actually state that the
substantial similarity test should be filtered through the eyes of a child. A
Ninth Circuit decision from 1987, Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., determined that
the ordinary observer test should be somewhat tailored when dealing with
children and copyrighted works aimed at them.141 In that case, the plaintiffs
held a copyright on a line of stuffed toy dinosaurs known as "Ding-A-
Saurs." 42 The defendants manufactured their own line of stuffed dinosaurs
known as the "Prehistoric Pet" line. 43 In determining whether the two lines
were substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit stated, "we may find substantial
similarity of expression only if a reasonable observer would infer that
Dakin's dolls capture the 'total concept and feel' of Shelley Aliotti's designs.
Because children are the intended market for the dolls, we must filter the
intrinsic inquiry through the perception of children."'"
The Aliotti decision is important not only because the court used the
perspectives of children as a threshold test, but also because it declined to
find the two works not substantially similar.4" The court held that the
similarity test is not "satisfied merely because the [two lines of dinosaurs]
i l at 620.
" Id at 619.
14 L at 619.
"' Alioi v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869,1872 (9th Cir. 1987).
142 Id at 899.
"4 Id at 900.
'" d at 902.
14S id
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share similar postures and body designs. Substantial similarity of expression
cannot be established by the fact that both lines of dinosaurs are gentle and
cuddly, given that stuffed animals are intended for children and are usually
designed to be soft and nonthreatening.""6 Thus, this decision shows that
just because more protection is provided to works aimed at children, it does
not necessarily follow that a defendant cannot show dissimilarity.
A recent and decisive ruling on the issue of copyrighted material aimed
at children is the case of Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc.4
This case revolved around a lovable purple dinosaur named Barney. The
plaintiff, Lyons Partnership, L.P. [Lyons], owned all the intellectual
property rights to the character "Barney." Barney was a Tyrannosaurus Rex
with a green chest and belly, green spots on his back and yellow toes."'
Barney had his own television show, Barney and Friends, on the Public
Broadcasting Network and had a huge following with young children. In
fact, the show was viewed weekly by 14 million youngsters, and over 50
million copies of Barney videos have been sold.149 When Barney appeared
live, Lyons had complete control over the adult inside the costume because
of the fear that an unauthorized person may behave inappropriately and hurt
Barney's reputation as a kind friend to all." Further, Lyons refused to
license any Barney costumes."' The defendant owned a costume rental shop
that rented a purple reptilian costume called "Duffy the Dragon."5 Lyons
sued the defendant for copyright infringement.5 3
The district court found that the Duffy costume did not infringe on
Lyons' copyright because it "is not... similar to Barney... when viewed
from the perspective of the average adult renter or purchasers of these
costumes."'4 The district court further felt that the "perspectives of children
were irrelevant" to the determination since adults were actually the ones to
rent or purchase the costume; children simply viewed the costumes on the
141 Iat a 901.
t4 243 F.3d 789, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (4th Cir. 2001).
Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 795.
149 Id
" Id (stating that "Lyons does not license Barney costumes because of its inability to police the
behavior of those who might appear in the costumne.
151 Id
1. Id at 795-96.
1.3 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d. 789,795,58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102,1105
(4th Cir. 2001).
114 Id. at 801.
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adults." The Ninth Circuit disagreed with that holding and stated that "this
exclusive focus on the average adult's perspective is too narrow and fails to
apply the established principles of the circuit.""s The Court held that when
the copyrighted work is clearly intended for a specific group, the court's
inquiry must be premised upon the perspective of persons within that
group." 7 Therefore, the "similarity of child-oriented works must be viewed
from the perspective of the child audience for which the products were
intended."'
The Court added that "[e]ven if adults can easily distinguish between
Barney and Duffy, a child's belief that they are one and the same could
deprive Barney's owners of profits in a manner that the Copyright Act5 9
deems impermissible.""6 The Court realized that children are extremely
influential on the purchases of works directed towards them. Consequently,
it stated that "even though children were not present during any of the
purchases or rentals testified to at trial, their impressions and views were the
primary influences on the purchase decision." 6' In fact, the adult's actions
of renting the costumes for children's parties and gatherings further prove
that children were the real intended audience.'6 Moreover, "the entertain-
ment of the children with the costumes could have a direct economic impact
on later wishes, later purchases, and general good will in an economic
sense-a potentially detrimental impact which the Copyright Act seeks to
protect."63
The Ninth Circuit also recognized that more inventors and manufactur-
ers might be at risk for liability, thereby, increasing the number of copyright
infringement cases. The court stated that "by considering the perspectives
of young children in the substantial-similarity analysis, the potential liability
for infringement might tend to broaden, given the reduced ability of young
children to distinguish between objectively different items and concepts. " '6
.I.. at 802.
Udl at 801.
"7 Id (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990)).
"' Lyons P'ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (4th Cir.
2001) (quoting Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731,736 (4th Cir. 1990)).
'"s U.S.C. SS 101-1101 (1994).
'6 Lyons, 243 F.3d at 803.
161 Id
162 Id
163 Id
164Id
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However, the court found that this concern was mitigated because "to the
extent that liability is broadened, it represents the reality of the confusion
and economic loss to the copyright owner."161 Hence, the only way to
realize the goals of the Copyright Act was to view Barney in the same way
that children do.
This case demonstrates that courts recognize that children can and do
influence the buying decisions of adults and, further, that their views and
perceptions are important in the world of copyrights.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1981, one legal scholar commented that "[i]t is unfortunate that the
several cases involving child-oriented works, in which an affirmative effort
was made to isolate the child audience, represent the exception rather than
the rule."' This remains true today even though the law of copyrights is
continuing to evolve, courts are continuing to refine it, and even more
research on the mind of a child has been done.
Most children live in their own happy worlds. They play with their toys
and make them come to life. They do not know what a copyright is, much
less how to infringe on one. They are not cognizant of the "sharp" business
practices of some marketeers who steal another's original expression for their
own pecuniary gain. They do not realize that what you see is not always
what you get and are often easily fooled by knock-offs with only slight
differences from the copyrighted work. Sometimes children realize too late
and are disappointed, sometimes they may never realize what has happened
and continue to play with the knock off, thinking that they have the
original.
Recently, psychological studies have found their way into the legal
arena. 61 Psychology, especially in the field of cognition, has added much to
our knowledge of children and how their minds work. Under both the
traditional and modern theories, psychologists agree that children have
'" Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789,803,58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102, 1112
(4th Cir. 2001).
1" Sitzer, supra note 11, at 415.
.. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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different perspectives on the world, different patterns of thinking, and
different behaviors than adults.1
68
Further, lawmakers even agree that children need special rights and
protections. Children are not allowed to vote, drink alcohol, or drive under
the American system. The law assumes that children lack the reasoning and
capacity to be able to do those types of activities rationally and
responsibly. 69 Moreover, both tort and contract law employ special rules
for children. Tort law often allows children to get away with behavior that
would probably not be tolerated in adults, and, many times children will not
be held liable for contributing to their own harm.70 The law of contracts
also allows a minor to avoid a contract without consequence.' In both torts
and contracts, courts have reasoned that children perceive and interact with
the world differently than adults.' Likewise, copyright law should
incorporate special rules for cases involving children.
Already, the "intended audience" test has become the preferred test for
many courts, even if the courts do find the intended audience to be the
ordinary lay person. A few courts have been aggressive and allowed more
specialized tests for infringement cases involving works aimed at children.7 3
The Ninth Circuit in Lyons 74 recognized that children perceived things more
simplistically than adults did. Therefore, the court ruled that works directed
at children require a different test for a finding of similarity, since the ones
most excited about the works cannot easily differentiate between similar
products.
Michael Sitzer stated that "[c]hildren represent a distinct and significant
consumer group.""" More and more products are being aimed at them, and
in their haste to acquire the best toys, children often do not stop to examine
the differences between similar works. For these reasons, works directed at
children need a greater copyright infringement protection. The perspectives
'" Perrochet & ColeUa, supra note 58, at 1337-38.
"6 Scott, supra note 67, at 547.
7 See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
1' See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
InlId
173 See supra notes 121-66 and accompanying text.
"7, Lyons P'ship L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (4th Cir.
2001).
v' Sitzer, supra note 11, at 411.
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and viewpoints of children should be considered when questioning whether
two or more works are substantially similar.
The law of copyrights began with a clause in the Constitution'76 and has
vastly grown over the past two hundred years. It started off slightly
muddled and confusing and has become more defined with many rules each
with their own prongs.'" However, it has not grown quite enough.
If other areas of the law have evolved so that the majority of courts apply
different reasoning when dealing with children, why can't the law of
copyrights do the same?
MONICA VINING
,' U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 8.
'r See supra notes 19-56 and accompanying text.
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